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Abstract The article explores the relationship between
specificities of broadcasting and sporting industries and
protection of intellectual property rights (copyrights) on the
one hand and the economic provisions in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the other. It
is generally built around the Murphy case but the discus-
sion provides a much broader perspective at the issues
raised by the Court in that judgment. We start off by
looking at the EU post-Lisbon competences in the areas of
sport and intellectual property and acknowledging the
interrelationship and delicate balance between these areas
and the EU goals of economic integration. The facts of the
case are set out and thereafter the analysis turns onto the
meaning and significance of ‘illicit device’ under Condi-
tional Access Directive; the notion of ‘abuse of rights’
under the EU law; breach of the EU rules on free move-
ment of services (Article 56 TFEU); objective justifications
relied on by the Premier League (protection of intellectual
property of sporting events and encouraging the public to
attend stadiums); the proportionality of the measures
employed; ‘closed periods’; the role that Article 165(1)
TFEU played in the conclusions of the Court of Justice in
Murphy; competition law aspects and convergence with
internal market objective justification framework; Audio-
visual Media Services aspects; and protecting copyrights
and associated works under the Copyright Directive.
Keywords Murphy  Premiere League  Competition law 
Broadcasting  Copyrights  Closed periods
1 Introduction
The realisation of the European Union’s internal market
project necessarily has implications for questions of the
interrelationship and balance between economic and social
dimensions of the Union’s law and policy. The exercise of
intellectual property rights that might conflict with the
Union’s goals of economic integration presents another
dimension requiring accommodation in the internal market
project. On 1 December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty amend-
ments came into force and introduced constitutional
changes in several areas of EU internal competence,
including sport and intellectual property rights. The two
areas differ significantly but there are some general paral-
lels in the substantive impact of those constitutional
changes that are worth considering as a background before
turning to the more specific analysis by the Court of Justice
(hereinafter referred to as the Court or ECJ) in joined cases
C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy.
The position of intellectual property rights in EU law
has been strengthened through Article 118 TFEU, which
provides explicit competence for EU legislation in this
area. This contrasts with the earlier situation, when such
rights were dealt with in relation to free movement or
competition, as an element that may justify restrictions to
other rights.1 For example, the Satellite Broadcasting
Directive was adopted on the legal basis used for other
legislation dealing with the free movement of services.
Article 308 EC [now Article 352 TFEU] provided a general
basis for EU legislative action in any outstanding area
where action at EU level was deemed necessary to achieve
the internal market objectives. Article 308 EC has been the
legal basis for the regulations on Community trademarks,
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Community plant-variety rights and Community designs.
Furthermore, Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU)
granted power to harmonise the laws of the Member States
to the extent required for the functioning of the internal
market. Article 95 EC has been used as a legal basis for the
Union’s action in the field of copyright and related rights.
There exists a respectable body of the Court’s case law
defining the delicate relationship between the intellectual
property legislation and the TFEU rules on free movement
of services and competition. Thus, although Article 118
TFEU is in a way a restatement of the existing powers and
does not confer a new competence upon the EU, the nov-
elty lies in the conferral of a specific EU mandate marking
the policy changes that might prove noteworthy in the
future adoption and enforcement of European IP
legislation.
Article 2(5) TFEU in combination with Article 6 TFEU
gives the Union a soft competence to carry out actions in
the area of sport but not to harmonise the Member States’
laws or regulations. According to Article 165(1) TFEU
‘[t]he Union shall contribute to the promotion of European
sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature
of sport, […] and its social and educational function.’ A
study on the Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy reveals
that, in general, Article 165 TFEU will have a limited
impact on the EU’s legal powers over sport.2 Unlike the
provisions on environmental protection and public health,
Article 165 TFEU does not contain a horizontal clause.
Nevertheless, the specificity of sport has been taken into
account when examining the legality of restrictions on free
movement ever since the first sports related case in 1974.
Two cases decided after the entry into force of Lisbon
Treaty in which the Court made first references to the
Article 165(1) TFEU are the judgments in Bernard and
Murphy.3 The reference to the ‘specific nature of sport’ in
Bernard merely reinforces already existing judicial possi-
bilities and Article 165(1) TFEU will add little further
protection for contested sports rules beyond that already
provided by the Court and the Commission—the two
institutions have already been highly receptive to ‘the
specific nature of sport’.4 Whereas Bernard has therefore
not opened any new avenues of appeal, the Court’s treat-
ment of Article 165 TFEU in that case supports the view
that ‘the new sports competence may have given further
weight to sports-related arguments’.5 The Court’s new
conclusions on training compensation fees in Bernard6 as
opposed to the Bosman7 judgment support the conclusion
that Article 165(1) TFEU has, indeed, given an additional
weight to sports related arguments.8 This was later con-
firmed by the Court’s approach in Murphy.
The Murphy case illustrates a number of different con-
siderations in EU law, where different principles meet and
conflict. On the face of it, the restrictions at issue in the
case clearly restrict free movement of goods within the EU
and almost as clearly show evidence of abuse of a domi-
nant position inconsistent with the competition rules. But
when examining the case more in detail, justifications for
restrictive rules are seen and the question instead turns to
the more complex one of proportionality of any exemptions
and the question of weighing the different interests to
evaluate such proportionality. The justification is found in
the special nature of broadcasting as well as in specificity
of sport and intellectual property protection. The three
subjects are regarded as permitting exemptions from gen-
eral EU law.
Broadcasting, especially television, developed in an
environment with different national controls and restric-
tions. Broadcasting was initially mainly a state function
serving national cultural, political as well as social pur-
poses. When commercial broadcasting started, restrictions
served the purpose of protecting the advertising market not
only for the benefit of national broadcasters but also with
consumer protection aims. When direct broadcasting sat-
ellites (in the 1980 s) and later other technologies (like the
internet) made it technically easy to provide international
broadcasting directly to audiences in any country, there
was a lot of pressure from broadcasters as well as the
audience to dispense with the various legal restrictions.9
Gradually this has happened, but the background of tele-
vision broadcasting as a tool for national policy still
influences the legal environment. Legitimate objectives for
national restrictions may be exploited for non-legitimate
protectionist purposes. As Keller writes, genuine social and
cultural policy measures also serve economic protectionist
goals.10
Even in societies with freedom of expression and a free
media, there are certain principles and rules for broad-
casting that regulate this medium more than most other
forms of media. One main such principle as well as
2 The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy (2010), p.10.
3 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL and others v. QC
Leisure and others; and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services
Ltd., judgment of 4 October 2011.
4 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies,
Study on the Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy (2010).
5 Ibid.
6 Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Olivier Bernard and
Newcastle United FC judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court
delivered on 16 March 2010.
7 Case C-415/93Union Royale Belge Socie´te´s de Football Associa-
tion and others v. Bosman and others [1995] ECR I-4921.
8 Pijetlovic 2010.
9 Keller 2011, p. 90 and p. 117.
10 Keller 2011, p. 91.
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justification for regulation is the management of the fre-
quency spectrum, which is a limited natural resource. Even
with digitalisation that allows a lot more content on the
airwaves, it is still necessary to regulate the use of this
spectrum so as to avoid interference between users of
spectrum. This also means that limiting the number of
broadcasters may be legitimate. The fact that broadcasters
are given the use of a natural resource that belongs to all
mankind also provides a justification for making certain
demands on broadcasters. The objective fact of the need to
regulate the frequency spectrum is usually coupled with
more subjective or political and social claims concerning
the impact of broadcasting on people and the interest of
states—even states that respect freedom of the media—to
be able to control this to some extent (for very different
reasons such as to prevent incitement to hatred and vio-
lence or copyright violations). This provides a justification
for rules preventing certain types of broadcasts or stipu-
lating what time of day they can be shown, but it also
provides the justification for rules on diversity and plurality
of broadcasting, public service broadcasting with special
programming rules and other similar content related rules.
The fact that broadcasters need licences to be able to use
frequencies and receiving equipment is set to receive sig-
nals on certain frequencies also means that there is an
interest in a certain stability of the market—that providers
of audiovisual media are financially and professionally
sustainable. To verify this is one element of the process of
licensing broadcasters.11
In the EU context, various considerations have led to a
broadcasting market that considers national borders to a
greater extent than what is the case for most areas within
the EU internal market. EU law mitigates negative effects
of this as much as possible but does not fundamentally
change the character of the market. The most encompass-
ing EU legislation in the field is the Audiovisual Media
Services Directive (2010/13/EU). The predecessor to this
Directive, the so-called Television without Frontiers
Directive, was first adopted in 1989 (Directive 1989/552/
EEC). These Directives are minimum harmonisation
Directives that allow more stringent rules while obligating
Member States to exercise control over broadcasts ema-
nating from their territory. The idea behind the regulation
is to allow for a free market in audiovisual broadcasts and
the rules primarily aim at enforcement of standards, leav-
ing the content of standards mainly to national law.12
Although thus justified and widely accepted, this does
not mean that specific broadcasting rules could not be open
for abuse, for example for protectionist reasons, as pointed
out above. The co-existence of broadcasting rules with
competition law, free movement within the EU as well as
intellectual property protection most often ends up as a
balancing of various interests and an evaluation of how
heavily the special broadcasting considerations weigh.
2 Facts of the joined cases
The English Football Association Premier League (FAPL)
grants its licensees the right to live broadcasting and
exploitation of Premier League matches within the specific
country-wide territory on an exclusive 3-year basis. In
order to safeguard the exclusivity the value of the rights for
FAPL, the broadcasters are at the same time required by
their licence agreements to prevent their broadcasts from
being viewed outside the specified broadcasting area. In
practice, this is done by requiring broadcasters to encrypt
the programme-carrying satellite signal and restrict the
circulation of authorised decoder cards only to persons
residing within their exclusive territory.
In one of the joined cases, FAPL and other applicants
brought proceedings against suppliers whose business
included importing and marketing in the United Kingdom
foreign decoder cards and equipment used to access foreign
satellite transmissions of live Premier Leagues football
matches in pubs and bars.13 They also brought an action
against four pub operators who used foreign decoder cards
to screen live Premier League matches.14 In another joined
case, one of those pub operators, Ms Karen Murphy,
unhappy with the price that exclusive broadcaster in UK
charged pubs for its Sky Sports services,15 obtained a
cheaper decoder from Greece and began showing Premier
League matches in her Portsmouth pub. In criminal pro-
ceedings launched against her in the UK she was fined on
the ground that the Greek decoder card was an illicit access
device. Ms Murphy appealed to the High Court, which then
made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice (‘the
Court’) under Article 267 TFEU.
FAPL and others complained that the practice of
importing and marketing foreign decoders, as well as their
use, constituted an infringement of their rights under the
provisions of national law16 designed to implement
11 This process is changing with digitalisation, in that transmission
and programme provision are increasingly separated in the licesning
process. The underlying values taken into consideration in the process
have changed less.
12 Dommering 2008, p. 20.
13 Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure
YouTube.
14 Ibid.
15 The price is ca. £1000 per month.
16 See Sections 297(1) and 298 of the UK Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act of 1988, as amended.
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Conditional Access Directive (CAD) 98/8417 and of the
copyright in various artistic and musical works, films and
sound recordings embodied in the Premier League match
coverage. The main issue in these cases was whether
Articles 56 TFEU and 101 TFEU preclude national legis-
lation and licence agreements that prohibit the use of for-
eign decoding devices.
3 Analytical overview of the judgment
3.1 The meaning and significance of ‘illicit device’
under Conditional Access Directive and the notion
of ‘abuse of rights’ under the EU law
The main objective of CAD is the approximation of
Member State laws concerning measures against illicit
devices giving unauthorised access to broadcasting ser-
vices.18 Under Article 4 CAD, Member States are obliged
to take measures to prohibit on their territory
(a) the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental
or possession for commercial purposes of illicit
devices; (b) the installation, maintenance or replace-
ment for commercial purposes of an illicit device […]
On the other hand, Article 3 CAD specifies that Member
States are not allowed for these reasons to restrict the
provision of protected services (broadcasting) which orig-
inate in another Member State or the free movement of
conditional access devices. Should they do so, they have to
provide an objective justification (i.e. a different reason
from those listed under Article 4 CAD) for their restrictive
measures and satisfy the requirements of proportionality to
escape falling foul of TFEU free movement provisions.
When such restrictions on economic freedoms originate
from agreements or practices of private undertakings they
have to comply with the competition provisions of the
TFEU. The distinction between a decoding device having
the status of a ‘conditional access device’ and one falling
under the definition of ‘illicit device’, therefore, plays a
crucial role in the initial assessment of the legality of
Member States’ measures that restrict commercial activi-
ties in decoding equipment. The sole difference between
the two is that the latter is used ‘without the authorisation
of the service provider’.19
The Grand Chamber of the Court first answered ques-
tions concerning the meaning of these crucial concepts
under the factual circumstances in casu. It found that a
foreign decoding device does not constitute an ‘illicit
device’ within the meaning of Article 2(e) CAD.20 This is
because ‘illicit device’ within the meaning of the CAD
covers access to broadcasting ‘free of charge’ (see para-
graph 6 the preamble) and placing it on market ‘without the
authorisation of the service provider’. In Murphy, decoding
devices were purchased in Greece and remuneration had
been duly paid to the Greek service provider who author-
ised their marketing within its exclusive broadcasting ter-
ritory. Importantly, this conclusion was not affected by the
fact that the foreign decoders were procured by provision
of a false name and address and that they were used in
breach of a contractual limitation permitting use only for
private purposes.21 In essence, the Court here, in the
framework of CAD, added another specific use of EU-
conferred rights to the list of those it accepted as not
constituting ‘abuse of rights’.
The prohibition of abuse of rights has been recognised
as a general principle of EU law, although the Court’s
approach in most areas has been to treat it solely as an
interpretative principle (which is not directly effective
without national anti-abuse measures), rather than as a self-
standing general principle.22 In Emsland-Sta¨rke, the
Commission contended that the prohibition of abuse of
rights is a general principle that exists in the legal systems
of all Member States and that it has already been applied in
the case law of the Court without being expressly recog-
nised as a general principle.23 However, the Court did not
recognise it expressly as such in Emsland-Sta¨rke. Only
later, in Kofoed, did the Court hold that the anti-abuse
provision in Directive 90/434 ‘reflects the general [EU]
law principle that abuse of rights is prohibited’.24 After a
series of incoherent cases, the current position is that an act
of an individual who is exercising fundamental freedoms
under the Treaty can only constitute abuse if the two
cumulative conditions laid down by the Court in Emsland-
Sta¨rke are met:
A finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of
objective circumstances in which, despite formal
observance of the conditions laid down by the [EU]
rules, the purpose of those rules has not been
17 Council Directive 98/84/EC on the legal protection of services
based on, or consisting of, conditional access OJ L 320/54,
28.11.1998.
18 Art. 1 of CAD.
19 Arts. 2(c) and (e) of CAD.
20 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, paras 62–67.
21 Ibid, paras 68–74.
22 Generally, there are three types of abuses of rights under EU law:
circumvention (or U-turn transactions), fraud and misuse. For
explanation of the concepts see, for example, Kjellgren 2000,
pp. 179–194.
23 Case C-110/99 (2000) Emsland-Sta¨rke GmbH v Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-Jonas. ECR I-1569.
24 Case C-321/05 (2007) Hans Markus Kofoed v Skatteministeriet,
ECR I-05795, para 38.
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achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element
consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage
from the [EU] rules by creating artificially the con-
ditions laid down for obtaining it.25
The entire CAD could possibly be seen as an anti-abuse
measure, for it listed the specific situations when Member
States can and must restrict abuses of freedom of move-
ment: namely, in the case of ‘illicit devices’. In such cases
traders cannot rely on economic freedoms to claim their
rights under the TFEU because, according to a ‘ghost
provision’ of the CAD, that would amount to abuse of
rights. Therefore, the Court did not have to fall back on the
general case law and Emsland-Sta¨rke criteria discussed
above, but instead focused on the meaning of ‘illicit
device’. That, in itself, was an exercise in finding out
whether there was an abuse of rights in the area as spe-
cifically covered by the CAD. Deciding that the decoders
were not illicit devices meant that traders were not abusing
their rights, and vice versa.
Against this background, the Court in Murphy could
have gone either way in determining whether the provision
of a false name and address to procure decoders and their
supply to another EU Member State constituted abuse of
rights. It could have easily interpreted the concept of ‘illicit
device’ under Article 2(e) CAD as meaning that the au-
thorisation given by the Greek broadcaster was not genuine
and valid because the broadcaster was unaware that the
devices would be used outside its authorised territory and
in breach of a contractual limitation permitting the use of
decoders only for private purposes. Authorization implies
conscious agreement and not an agreement given on the
basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation by another party.
This is a fundamental rule of any law of obligations and the
Greek broadcaster could have brought an action for breach
of contract before a national court. It is true that placing
devices on the market was authorised, but ‘authorization’ is
an expandable concept and can be interpreted as entailing
conditions under which the devices are placed on the
market. The broadcaster was relying on the terms of the
contract for the conditions of use and had given an
authorization only for a particular purpose.
Thus, the outcome of the case could have been different,
and in reaching such a different outcome the Court would
not even have had to apply counter-textual interpretation.
Instead, the decoders procured by the provision of a false
name and address were considered ‘conditional access
devices’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) CAD. As seen
above, Article 3 CAD neither imposes a mandatory
requirement on such devices nor prohibits EU Member
States from restricting their use. Having found that the
CAD does not harmonise national legislation prohibiting
their use26 the ECJ did not further elaborate on the legality
of the devices and instead turned its attention to the com-
patibility of UK measures under the TFEU provisions on
the internal market.
3.2 Existence of the restriction under Article 56 TFEU
Examining the case under Article 56 TFEU, the Court did
not take much time to find that the national legislation
conferring legal protection on contested contractual clauses
in broadcasting agreements restricts the freedom to provide
services by preventing the access to service for recipients
outside the Member State of broadcast.27 It then considered
the applicability of two objective justifications put forth:
protecting intellectual property rights and encouraging the
public to attend football stadiums.
3.3 Objective justification and proportionality:
protection of intellectual property of sporting
events
The Opinion of the Advocate General starts with the words
that protection of the economic interests of authors is
becoming increasingly important. This can be achieved
through the system of exclusive rights in the licensed ter-
ritory, which often coincides with the territory of a coun-
try.28 The judgement lists a number of international treaties
on copyright to establish that the right to broadcast is such
a right that the holder of a copyright possesses. This is not
in doubt in the case, while the meaning of such a right and
the extent to which it can be used to partition the EU
market is of interest.
The recital in the Directive 93/83/EC on satellite
broadcasting illustrates the interest of the copyright ques-
tion for modern broadcasting in the EU market, by pointing
out—as quoted by the Advocate General29—that modern
means of broadcasting may lead to a threat of works being
exploited without the author receiving any remuneration or
on the other hand, to copyright holders blocking free
movement.30
Although the principle of exhaustion of rights is difficult
to apply to services, it fits with the philosophy behind this
principle to discuss only the economic rights linked to
copyright, as the moral rights including the decision if and
how to show a work would no longer be relevant once the
25 Case C-110/99, Emsland-Sta¨rke, paras 52–53.
26 This finding indirectly subsequently freed Ms Murphy from
criminal liability in the national proceedings.
27 Ibid., paras 85–89.
28 Opinion of the Advocate General para 1–2.
29 Opinion of the Advocate General para 29.
30 Recital 5.
86 Int Sports Law J (2013) 13:82–96
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work has been put out on the market in any EU Member
State. The author (holder of the copyright) has the right to
decide whether to show a work, in what form and so on, but
once the work is available anywhere on the EU market it is
presumed that it can be made available also in all other
Member States—provided the economic rights are safe-
guarded. The principle of exhaustion of rights was elabo-
rated in relation to patented goods, but the principal idea
behind it remains valid for all forms of intellectual prop-
erty. As pointed out in the Copyright Directive (Directive
2001/29/EC) the principle of exhaustion does not as such
apply to services.31 At the same time, the idea that there
should be no objections for copyrighted works to move
freely in the EU based on the moral rights included in
copyright fits with general principles of EU law.
In broadcasting terms (and in Directive 93/83) the
meaning of communication to the public is the actual
element of making a programme visible to television
audience (Article 1.2(a) Directive 93/83), in the form of
private individuals or anyone else. One important aspect is
that the audience is not present at the place where the act of
making available originates. The composition of an audi-
ence (individuals or groups, open to the general public or
for a closed group) can be taken into consideration when
negotiating terms upon which programmes are made
available. Here the copyright law distinction of whether
something is for private or public use comes into the pic-
ture. That this is relevant is shown in the Copyright
Directive 2001/29 as well as in intellectual property con-
ventions like the Berne convention where a difference is
stipulated between public and private use. The same term is
thus used with different meanings. It is well established
that the cost of using a copyrighted product for private use
is different and normally much lower than for public use.
In EU law, the Directive on lending rights illustrates this
(Directive 2006/115/EC on rental right and lending right
and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of
intellectual property). Any broadcast that can be received
by the public is a communication to the public in the
broadcasting law sense, whereas in the copyright sense, the
composition of the audience is relevant. The reasoning of
the Advocate General as well as of the Court is not always
clear on which meaning of communication to the public
they are discussing, but the relevant question in any event
is that of public or private use, with public use being
potentially for cost—a distinction made in the English law
on the matter as mentioned in the case.
The TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention both
reflect the principle that the holder of intellectual property
rights (copyright or neighbouring right) has the right to
decide over a broadcast and how it is made available to a
larger audience.
It is clear from Directive 93/83 (Article 3) that handling
copyright protected works in the sense of deciding how to
exploit them, what to charge for this and so on, should be
subject to agreements between the parties concerned.
Public use can give the right to charge a higher price for the
right to use copyrighted work.
The protection of intellectual property rights was
accepted as a part of the public policy derogation already in
previous case-law.32 Sporting events were held in Murphy
as forming the subject of that protection. Importantly,
however, the starting point in reaching this conclusion was
the Court’s refusal to classify Premier League matches as
‘works’ within the meaning of the Copyright Directive as
they were not original product of the author’s own intel-
lectual creation. It was also made clear that the EU has no
other basis in intellectual property legislation to protect
sporting events.33 But the Court then held sporting events
to be of such unique and original character as to make them
capable of being transformed into a subject-matter of
protection by intellectual property law.34 Thereafter the
Court made a reference to Article 165(1) for the second
time ever.35 Accordingly, it was held permissible for the
Member States to employ various means to protect sporting
events, including by virtue of protection of intellectual
property rights, even if they restrict free movement, as long
as the restrictions are proportionate.
Thus the judgment made it clear that EU law has no
basis to protect any form of intellectual property of sport-
ing events, but since sporting events are so specific in their
nature, Member States’ legislation may provide such pro-
tection. Article 165(1) TFEU played a role in opening this
avenue of protection by domestic legal systems. It must be
acknowledged that it has not been a decisive role as the
Court already held the sporting events to be of a unique and
original character capable of forming a subject of protec-
tion before making a reference to Article 165(1) TFEU.
However, constructing the subsequent reasoning around
the Treaty-based obligation to take into account specificity
of sport and its social and educational functions certainly
strengthened the soundness of the argument and furnished
it with a firm constitutional support. Even before the
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty amendments the
Court would probably have reached the same conclusion
based on the ‘specific nature of sports’ alone, a concept
entirely based on the state of affairs in the sporting industry
31 Para 29 of the preamble.
32 Para 94 of Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08Murphy.
33 Ibid., paras 96–99.
34 Ibid., para 100.
35 Ibid., para 101. The first time the Court mentioned Art. 165(1) was
in C-325/08 Bernard.
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and their recognition in the Court’s jurisprudence. Objec-
tives specific to the sporting industry accepted as legitimate
before the inclusion of Article 165(1) TFEU were, for
example, ensuring regularity of competitions,36 maintain-
ing the balance between clubs by preserving a certain
degree of equality and uncertainty as to results, encour-
aging the recruitment and training of young players,37 and
combating doping in order for competitive sport to be
conducted fairly including the need to safeguard equal
chances for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and
objectivity of competitive sport and ethical values in
sport.38 After Murphy, the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights of sporting events can be added to the list of
aims accepted as legitimate in the interpretation and
enforcement of the EU law in the area of sport. The dif-
ference between pre- and post-Article 165(1) TFEU
methodology in generating this list is the introduction of
the constitutional nature of the obligation to take into
consideration the specificity of the sport, as opposed to a
loose obligation not delineated in clear and express terms
in either the Treaty or the Court’s jurisprudence that does
not have a strict precedential value. Hence, the inclusion of
Article 165(1) in the Treaty is a not insignificant devel-
opment—in addition to giving additional weight to sport-
related arguments, as explained in the introduction, it also
contributed towards legal certainty for sporting bodies in as
far as sports’ specific nature and socio-educational function
will have to be paid due regard in the interpretation and
enforcement of the EU law as a matter of constitutional
requirement.
This part of the judgement has not yet affected the
interpretation of intellectual property legislation at EU
level. However, by including sporting events in the dero-
gation based on intellectual property protection, it has
slightly broadened the scope of that derogation under the
EU free movement law.
The Murphy case also illustrates that the restrictions do
not necessarily have to originate from sporting bodies to
benefit from the legitimate aim recognised on the basis of
specificity of sport. An objective worthy of protection is to
be taken as such regardless of who adopts the restrictive
measures as long as the infringing party can be considered
an addressee under the internal market provisions. This
particular justification, placed within the broader deroga-
tion of intellectual property rights protection, is rooted in
the specific nature of sporting events in general (as opposed
to being confined to particular sporting events) and inter-
pretation of the EU law in accordance with the Article
165(1) TFEU, so as to allow for the proportionate national
law to take precedence over the EU free movement
provisions.
The proportionality of a measure taken at the national
level to protect intellectual property of the sporting events
was emphasised by the Court in paragraph 105 of the
Murphy case. On the facts of the case, the restrictions in
broadcasting agreements were held to be disproportionate.
The specific subject-matter of the intellectual property did
not guarantee the rights holders concerned the opportunity
to demand the highest possible remuneration. Protection of
intellectual property rights which included payment of a
premium by broadcasters to obtain absolute territorial
protection partitioned national markets and maintained
artificial price differences and went beyond what is nec-
essary for ‘appropriate remuneration’ to the right holders.39
Hence, a premium paid in exchange for territorial exclu-
sivity in itself would form a part of ‘appropriate remu-
neration’ and would be proportionate, but only if that
exclusivity is not accompanied by export prohibitions on
decoding devices granting absolute territorial protection. In
other words, the system of sole licensed broadcaster per
territory which encrypts programme-carrying signal is
allowed, but restricting trade in decoder devices on the top
of such territorial exclusivity is not. The possibility of
provision of cross-border services to TV viewers in other
Member States should not be affected by exclusivity
clauses in broadcasting agreements. The Court followed
the opinion of the Advocate General in the case who
considered that offsetting the price differences between
Member States by trade is a part of the idea behind the
internal market and marketing the broadcasting rights by
the Premier League on this basis amounts to ‘profiting from
the elimination of the internal market’.40
There is no clearly recognisable pattern regarding the
intensity of the proportionality test carried out by the Court
in different cases. Generally, the intensity will vary
depending on the restriction in question. From the Meca-
Medina case41 it does not follow that the Court has given
any special consideration to sport in this regard. Kaburakis
et al. correctly note that the proportionality test applied in
Murphy was stricter than the one carried out in Bernard,42
in which the Court for the first time ever referred to Article
165(1) TFEU and it did so in the context of the required
standard of application of proportionality test.43 This
36 Case C-176/96 (2000) Lehtonen and Castors Braine. ECR I-2681.
37 Case C-415/93 Bosman and Case C-325/08 Bernard.
38 Case 519/04 Meca-Medina.
39 Paras 105–117.
40 Para 192 of her Opinion in Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08
Murphy.
41 Case C-519/04 (2006) David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v.
Commission. ECR I-6991.
42 Kaburakis et al. 2012, p. 313.
43 See para 40 of Case C-325/08 Bernard. For discussion see
Pijetlovic 2010, pp. 862–867.
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reference was omitted at proportionality stage of analysis
in Murphy because there were no specificities and social
and educational functions of sport involved and the issues
considered were strictly commercial.
3.4 Objective justification and proportionality:
encouraging the public to attend stadiums
UEFA’s Regulations governing the implementation of
Article 48 of the UEFA Statutes allow, but do not require,
national associations to set two and a half hours period on
Saturdays or Sundays during which no live football matches
can be transmitted. The purpose of this so-called ‘closed
period’ or ‘blocked hours’ rule is to ensure that people are not
deterred from going to the stadiums to watch local matches or
participate in amateur or youth matches on the account of
live transmission. The Football Association in England
designated this closed period for Saturday afternoons. As
required by the UEFA rules, this is the time corresponding to
the domestic fixture schedule when the majority of the games
in the top national leagues are played. The local broadcasters
are required to respect this rule by the terms of their licence
agreements. Also, national associations are required to
observe blocked hours in their agreements with broadcasters
when selling in the territory of other national associations
that have designated their own closed periods.
Citing this arrangement, FAPL claimed that the impor-
tation of decoder cards would make it impossible to
enforce closed periods.44 But the Court rightfully dismissed
this argument in paragraph 123 saying that
[…] even if the objective of encouraging such
attendance of stadiums by the public were capable of
justifying a restriction on the fundamental freedoms
suffice it to state that compliance with the afore-
mentioned rule can be ensured, in any event, by
incorporating a contractual limitation in the license
agreements between the right holders and the
broadcasters, under which the latter would be
required not to broadcast those Premier League
matches during closed periods. It is indisputable that
such a measure proves to have a lesser adverse effect
on the fundamental freedoms than application of the
restriction at issue in the main proceedings.
It is indeed far less restrictive, and yet as effective, to
contractually oblige foreign broadcasters to respect seller’s
local rules on closed periods.
Regarding the precedential value of the justification put
forth, the Court left us without clear indication on whether
the goal of encouraging the public to attend football
stadiums and participate in matches was capable of justi-
fying restrictions. Its wording ‘even if the objective of
encouraging such attendance of stadiums by the public
were capable of justifying a restriction’ would suggest that
it is not. But the Court then goes on to dismiss the propor-
tionality of the measure, a step which is not necessary for
objectives not considered worthy of protection. The reason
for this ambiguity in analysis might be that the Court did
not necessarily have to be more specific, as the restrictions
themselves were easily proven disproportionate; the out-
come of the analysis would have been the same in either
case. Unlike the Court, the Advocate General seems to
have accepted attendance at stadiums and participation in
matches as capable of constituting a legitimate goal under
EU internal market law.45 It is important to note here that
in assessing the value of this objective the Advocate
General relied on Article 165 TFEU but the Court did not.
Siding with the Court on this issue, it is submitted that
encouraging attendance at stadiums and participation in
sporting activities should not be held in such high regard as
worthy of protection at the expense of free movement and
partitioning of internal market. Merely creating opportu-
nities for the general public to engage in sports participa-
tion and attendance at stadiums is sufficient. Once the
opportunities exist, even the argument that sport promotes
public health would not justify a different conclusion.
People usually like to de-stress during weekends and the
choice of methods should be entirely up to them, as long as
choices exist. Some prefer staying at home and being far
from football crowds and socialising; who is to say that this
might not be a more suitable personal health choice for
both mental and physical workers. Attendance at stadiums,
participation in matches and watching a live transmission
are three qualitatively different activities that are poor
substitutes for one another.46
Furthermore, under the contemporary model of financ-
ing employed by the clubs in the Premier League, revenues
from gate receipts are by far exceeded by revenues derived
from the sales of media rights and are no longer so crucial
to the financial survival of the clubs.47 But in lower football
leagues, or in other sports, gate receipts still represent a
major part of the clubs’ budgets and the Court might be
receptive towards the justification if the arguments were
repackaged and the objective were renamed as, for exam-
ple, a solidarity mechanism, enhancing competitive bal-
ance between leagues, or improving training conditions for
young talent (given that clubs in lower leagues are a
breeding ground for that talent). So, protecting gate
44 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, para 122.
45 This follows from Opinion of AG in Joined Cases C-403/08 and
C-429/08 Murphy, para 206–210.
46 Ibid. (suggested in para 209).
47 See Deloitte’s Annual Report of Football Finance 2011.
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receipts of the lower division clubs by closed periods for
reasons such as solidarity and competitive balance by
means of blocked hours is an objective likely to be
accepted by the Court, but restricting free movement and
partitioning the internal market with the objective of
encouraging public attendance at stadiums and participa-
tion in sport—which the public can do at will anyway—
should not be given the status of objective justification in
EU law.
Restrictions to free movement may be justified on
grounds of a legitimate public interest and the ECJ has
expressed various such interests in its case law, on pur-
pose not making an exhaustive list of what such interest
may be as this should be determined in each case based
on all the circumstances in such a case. However, the
aims should not be economic and the aim must be com-
patible with Union aims.48 In the media field, cultural
policy is an important aim in relation to which movement
may be restricted. The differences between cultural poli-
cies of Member States mean that some States will have
rules for broadcasting for which there is no equivalence in
another Member State. This does not mean that the rules
are not legitimate or the aim not compatible with a Union
aim.49 However, the proportionality test applies in all
events. Whether the aim to make people attend live sports
events is a cultural policy measure or protecting another
legitimate public interest and whether such a policy
applies throughout the EU or only in some countries and
in relation to some sports is not as relevant as the pro-
portionality of the measure.
Accepting the objective as legitimate thus does not
mean that the contested rule is in accordance with the
Treaty provisions. The rule still has to be suitable and
proportionate. To demonstrate suitability in this particular
case would be a challenging task, to say the least, espe-
cially in the light of the intensity of the application of the
proportionality test as suggested by the Advocate General.
She assumed that the blocked hours rule might have been
designed at least in part to safeguard economic interests of
Premier League clubs by partitioning the internal market
and considered that ‘a particularly strict test is therefore to
be applied to the demonstration of the need for closed
periods’.50 Then she seems to have suggested that using
closed periods to attain any objective can hardly ever be
suitable because economic evidence and practice from
other countries is heavily weighted towards the conclusion
that the attendance at stadiums and sport participation is
not affected by live transmission.51 Thus, even the public
health, solidarity, competitive balance and any other ini-
tially accepted legitimate objective, would all be predes-
tined to fail. As a matter of a sound judicial advice, the
Advocate General ultimately left a burden for FAPL to
prove that different conditions prevailed in English foot-
ball, which necessarily required protection by means of
closed periods and which would in turn justify a different
conclusion on the point of suitability of the restricting rule.
The strictness of the application of proportionality makes
any such burden particularly onerous as the FAPL evidence
would have to show that live transmissions have ‘sub-
stantial detrimental effects on attendance at matches and/or
participation in football matches in order for enforcement
of the closed periods to be able to prevail over the adverse
effects on the internal market.’52
3.5 Competition law aspects and convergence
with internal market objective justification
framework
Even though the restraint to trade under both national
legislation and the broadcasting licence agreements was
identical and posed identical legal questions, the national
legislation was examined under free movement law, and
the clauses in agreements under EU competition law, the
latter set of provisions being generally addressed to private
undertakings and the former to the Member States.
Competition law and free movement law have slightly
different but complementary objectives. The initial dichot-
omy in the application of the two set of norms is among their
respective circle of addressees. As a general rule, free
movement provisions in EU law apply to state bodies and
state measures, rather than to private parties. Competition
law on the other hand primarily aims at private undertakings.
Baquero Cruz considered that the heart of the relationship
between the provisions on competition and free movement
lies in the eventual application of the free movement rules in
the private sphere and of the competition rules to state
action.53 With regard to sporting bodies, however, the pub-
lic/private distinction is not very pronounced, if at all. As we
have seen in cases like Walrave, Bosman, Delie`ge, Lehtonen,
48 Case C-288/89 Gouda (Mediawet I), Case 352/85 Bond van
Adverteerders. See also Bo¨ttcher and Castendyk 2008, pp. 118–119.
49 Case C-384/93 Alpine investments. Bo¨ttcher and Castendyk 2008,
p. 119.
50 Para 208 of her Opinion.
51 Ibid, para 209 reads: ‘[…] in an investigation of the closed periods
under competition law the Commission found that only 10 of 22
associations had actually adopted a closed period. No closed periods
were adopted in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, or in Northern
Ireland, that is to say, within the sphere of influence of English
football. Furthermore, in Germany today all Bundesliga matches are
evidently transmitted live without attendance at matches in the top
two leagues suffering as a result.
52 Para 210 of her Opinion in Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08
Murphy.
53 Baquero Cruz 2002.
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Piau, and Meca-Medina, sports federations may be subject to
both set of norms without anyone seriously questioning their
applicability on the basis on improperness of addressee. This
aspect of convergence between competition and internal
market provisions is facilitated by the horizontal direct effect
of both set of norms.
Furthermore, in the application of both sets of rules to
the same restrictive measure, it is very unlikely that the
measure found legal under one set of rules will offend
against another set of rules. This approach to convergence
is confirmed in general terms by the Advocate General in
Murphy, who used her conclusion in the freedom of
movement area to support her conclusion in competition
law. She said that
conflicting assessments of the fundamental freedoms
and competition law are to be avoided in princi-
ple. […]an anti-competitive agreement within the
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU can be justified
pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU. However, a person
who relies on that provision must demonstrate, by
means of convincing arguments and evidence, that
the conditions for obtaining an exemption are satis-
fied. In this connection, it would appear that similar
considerations should apply as in the examination of
whether a restriction of freedom to provide services is
justified.54
The Advocate General was apparently of the opinion
that convergence ought to exist on the level of justification,
but also in general, including on the level of prohibition.55
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court confirmed the result
obtained under the free movement provisions: clauses in
the exclusive license agreements which include obligations
on broadcasters not to supply decoding devices outside
their exclusive territories restrict competition by object and
are prohibited by terms of Article 101(1) TFEU.56 Nor-
mally, ‘object cases’ (in which the restrictions were sub-
jectively intended and not just objectively achieved as in
‘effect cases’) are very unlikely to receive an exemption
under Article 101(3) TFEU, but the possibility nevertheless
exists.
The utility of establishing convergence between the
free movement ordinary objective justification framework
and Article 101(3) TFEU would be relatively limited
because legitimate aims providing exemption are non-
economic under free movement whereas Article 101(3)
recognises only economic efficiency arguments. However,
the results of the proportionality test are perfectly trans-
plantable even when it is not the same measure that is
examined as long as the restrictions posed by both are the
same. This was confirmed by the Court in Murphy when it
only referred to its findings on (dis)proportionality of the
measure under internal market law to hold that the
exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU does not apply in the
case. Had it been a regulatory rule on professional ethics
passed by a sporting body (and thus the avenue of Wou-
ters/Meca-Medina test57 available to the rule under com-
petition provisions) all of the objective justification
findings from internal market law would have been fully
transplantable and the Court would have referred not just
to the part of the findings under free movement dealing
with the proportionality of the measure, but also to the rest
of the considerations under the objective justification
framework.58
Keller points out that EU competition law in comparison
with free movement law has a more ambiguous impact on
the European media market. If free movement law clearly
supports the possibilities for media to move freely, albeit
with certain restrictions for cultural or other policy reasons,
competition law may prohibit behaviour that market
players would like to engage into widen or strengthen their
markets. Given the great importance of sports for adver-
tising and other forms of revenue for broadcasting, com-
petition law restrictions may be felt especially in relation to
sports. As far as the market as a whole is concerned,
competition law should serve to increase plurality and
support more availability of content, even if it may mean
restrictions on the behaviour of specific broadcasters.59 It is
worth stressing that in broadcasting (media) regulation and
54 Opinion of AG in Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, paras
249–250.
55 In C-222/07 (2009) Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v
Regione Sardegna. ECR I-01407 she similarly considered that when
the same questions arise under the law of State aid as with regard to
the fundamental freedoms, the reply to the latter should not differ
from the reply to the former and the same criteria must be applied in
both cases to avoid conflicting assessments. See paras 134 and 135 of
her Opinion in that case.
56 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, paras 134–146.
57 This test provides that ‘not every agreement between undertakings
or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the
freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls
within the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1) TFEU]. For the
purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account
must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision
of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects
and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered
whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are
inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others,
paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.’ See para 42 of C-519/
04 Meca-Medina.
58 Starting from paragraph 93. The Courts’ selected reference to
paragraphs 105–124 also confirms the point made above in Chapter 4,
section 10.2.4., that encouraging the public to attend and participate
in matches is probably not accepted as an objective worthy of
protection under EU law, and that Court was only dealing with the
point of proportionality.
59 Keller 2011, pp. 144–145.
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legislation, the aim of provisions enhancing plurality and
limiting ownership of several media outlets or of media
outlets of different kinds serves other goals than restric-
tions on concentration in competition law. The broadcast-
ing law looks at content from a substantive side, supporting
political and cultural pluralism, whereas competition law is
interested in market strength and the potential to abuse a
dominant position.60 However, in the Murphy case there
was no element of protection of media pluralism at hand, as
the reasons for the geographical restrictions for decoders as
well as the different licensing for private or public use both
served other interests.
It is clear that for a broadcaster the control over a major
sporting event may be a key to success as there is very low
substitutability for such events—people want to watch a
particular event and in real time. A broadcaster that shows
such events can use this to become dominant in its field,
but even more evidently the organisation that has primary
control over the rights to the sporting event holds a dom-
inant position.61
3.6 Audiovisual Media Services aspects
In the original cases in the English courts, the defendants
aligned themselves with a general trend toward an EU
market in audiovisual media services, which they felt was
shown by, for example, copyright-related EU provisions.62
However, the strength of any such trend is not evident as in
fact there are still a number of special rules in the audio-
visual services sector in the EU, making this sector stand
apart from other services.
As the preamble to the Audiovisual Media Service
Directive (2010/13/EU) points out (paragraph 5), audiovi-
sual media services are as much cultural services as they
are economic and this is what justifies application of spe-
cial rules. Thus this aspect of the Murphy case cannot be
overlooked. The Directive also stresses that Member States
must prevent acts that are detrimental to the free movement
and trade in television programmes or that create dominant
positions that are detrimental to pluralism and freedom
(preamble, paragraph 8). There should be a balance
between the special rules and the free market. The right of
broadcasters to acquire television broadcasting rights on an
exclusive basis to events of high interest to the public is
recognised explicitly in the Directive while naming sport-
ing events as something to which wide access should be
enabled and regarding which special rules can be made in
the Member States on exclusive broadcasting rights (pre-
amble, paragraph 48–49).
Speculative rights purchases to events of a major
importance by broadcasters from another Member State are
regulated specifically (preamble, paragraph 51) in line with
the idea of the Directive that events must in reality be
accessible to people and that it is for Member States to
decide what events are of special importance and how they
are made accessible.
The perceived importance of major sporting events for
the population of European countries lies behind broad-
casting rules on special treatment of such events, namely
that they should be accessible to the majority of the pop-
ulation for no special charge (i.e. in addition to regular
broadcasting subscription or cable fees). This principle is
established by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
and it is also formulated in EU law, first in the Television
Without Frontiers Directive (Article 3a) and moved almost
unchanged to Article 14 of the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive. The Member States should draw up lists of what
events are such events of major importance for society and
it is natural that the exact list of events will vary between
countries—for example as different sports are more pop-
ular in different countries. The competence for making a
list belongs to Member States and EU law is restricted to
ensuring mutual recognition of any lists.
Directive 2002/19/EC, the so called Access Directive,
part of the 2002 package of directives related to telecom-
munications or as it also is called, the Electronic Com-
munications Regulatory Framework, deals with access to
digital broadcasting (Article 5(1)b and Article 6). The
objectives are economic as well as non-economic; namely
to ensure cultural diversity and media pluralism through
obligating undertakings involved in electronic communi-
cation services to allow interoperability and access to
infrastructure (like electronic programme guides and
application programme interfaces). These provisions do not
relate to the situation of end-users but to that of service
providers and the scope is rather narrow, in that only digital
broadcasting falls under the rules.63 Thus systems such as
encryption to permit markets to be divided between dif-
ferent content providers (broadcasters) are in general not
affected, but the Access Directive aims solely at enabling a
market to be created for digital broadcasting content pro-
viders by making sure they can be accessed on equal terms
and that services are interoperable. The overall aim of
plurality and diversity in addition to the purely economic
competition aim is the same as in general broadcasting law,
but the provisions are formulated in a narrower way, as this
Directive does not deal with copyright or cultural issues or
the other reasons why the encryption and territorial divi-
sion of broadcasting markets has been created in the first
place. It just aims at preventing digitalisation of60 Keller 2011, p. 419.
61 Keller 2011, pp. 417–418.
62 Anderson 2011, p. 58. 63 Helberger 2008 at pp. 1132–1133 and p. 1135.
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broadcasting transmission being used in order to narrow
down markets and create obstacles for interoperability. The
Commission has indeed expressed clearly in the elabora-
tion of the Access Directive as well as in other contexts, the
importance of separating regulation of transmission from
regulation of broadcasting content. In practice this is not
always easy.64 The limited remit of the Access Directive
can e contrario provide some support for the view that
division of the markets for the broadcasting audience via
encryption remains a permissible feature of the EU
audiovisual media market.
Directives dealing specifically with audiovisual media
services thus support the idea that there can be special
measures to ensure certain exclusivity, including territorial
division, in the broadcasting field as this is justified by
special considerations linked to media. A system of a kind
that has been developed with exclusive broadcasting rights
linked to territory and national organs handling this is
supported by the Directives. The Court does not discuss the
media law aspects specifically in Murphy, but presumably
finds that the justification for special rules does not allow
total partitioning of the market—even if there is nothing in
the media directives that prohibits such partitioning.
3.7 Protecting copyrights and associated works
under the Copyright Directive
Having found that the EU internal market and competition
law principles require that a European citizen should be
able to purchase a cheaper decoder card from another
Member State to gain access to foreign satellite transmis-
sions, the Court answered a set of questions regarding the
use of the broadcast once it is received. Although the live
transmission was not a subject of copyright, the associated
works such as the opening video sequence, the Premier
League anthem, pre-recorded films showing highlights of
recent Premier League matches and various graphics
were.65 The reproduction of such features within the
memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen to
enable the broadcasts to be transmitted and received con-
stituted ‘reproduction’ within the meaning of Article 2
(e) of the Copyright Directive, but since the reproduction
fulfilled the exemption conditions under Article 5(1) of that
directive, (inter alia, it was temporary and transient and
had no independent economic significance) it did not
require the authorisation of the copyright holder.66 How-
ever, with regard to works that are ‘communicated to the
public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Copyright
Directive, the transmission of broadcast works to a new
public (i.e., a public which was not taken into account by
the authors of the protected works when they authorised
their use by the communication to the original public)
constituted a new communication to the public.67 As such,
it did not fulfil the exemption conditions in Article 5(1)
because it can be said that it has ‘independent economic
significance’. The Court here assumes that when authors
‘authorise a broadcast of their works, they consider, in
principle, only the owners of television sets who, either
personally or within their own private or family circles,
receive the signal and follow the broadcasts.’68 This might
indeed hold true in all other broadcasts but sports broad-
casts in which the right owners are well-aware of the fact
that their copyrighted material is going to be used widely in
the public establishments, pubs in particular. The trans-
mission of the copyrighted works in pub settings was
considered to have satisfied the formula of a new ‘com-
munication to the public’ and thus required authorisation.69
So the Court distinguished between use in private homes
and use containing the element of ‘communication to
public’, which includes transmission of broadcast works in
places where people gather, such as cafe´s, restaurants,
pubs, clubs, offices, airplanes, etc. However, the key to the
proper reading of the judgment should not be the objective
test related to the place where the works are shown, but the
subjective test related to the public ‘considered by the
authors when they authorised the broadcasts of their
works’.70 The Court could not have been unaware of the
fact that authors of the works (in this case FAPL) already
take into account and know that exclusive broadcasters will
be serving both private homes and pubs. It is therefore
submitted that pub-clients of the broadcasters do not need
any additional authorisation from the authors of works,
whether they are domestic or foreign clients. Such au-
thorisation is clearly given to exclusive broadcasters for
both types of clients when the rights are sold and the public
in the public house constitutes an ‘original public’ when it
comes to broadcasting of the Premier League.
In order for intellectual property rights—that are terri-
torial in nature and that until now are determined more
often by national law and on the level of the Member States
than on EU level—not to create too many restrictions on
free movement or to breach EU competition law, the
principle of exhaustion is essential. This means that once
an object has been placed on the market in any EU Member
State, parallel imports may not be prevented by reference
to the intellectual property right. As Heinemann points out,
the principle is still developing even if it is already well
64 Ibid, p. 1143.
65 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Murphy, para 149.
66 Ibid, para 182.
67 Ibid, para 197.
68 Ibid, para 198.
69 Ibid, para 199 and 207.
70 Ibid, para 199.
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established and although primarily a principle of free
movement, it affects also competition law as any agree-
ments must be examined with this principle in mind. Pri-
vate parties are not allowed to erect barriers to intra-EU
trade that this principle safeguards. The principle presumes
consent: the intellectual property right is only exhausted
following voluntary and consensual placement onto the
market.71
Obtaining material under copyright protection includes
an important distinction between public and private use of
the material. Private use is allowed of any copyright pro-
tected material that is obtained legally. Public use, how-
ever, may be restricted and generally the costs for such use
are much higher, as this is a way in which owners of
copyright protected material make money. With the ter-
minology used by the ECJ, this kind of distinction can be
seen to illustrate the difference between the existence and
exercise of an intellectual property right: its existence is
within national competence whereas the way it is exercised
may be within EU competence, as such exercise could
contravene EU law on free movement or competition.
Thus, in this context, the possibility of giving different
rights of use of copyrighted material is linked to the exis-
tence of the right and belongs in national competence. It is
not against EU law to restrict the use of copyrighted
material, even if the effect is a restriction on the right to
provide services, as the reason for such restrictions is
linked to the specific subject matter of copyright law—
something which should not be interfered with by the
application of EU law.
Copyright law and broadcasting (media) law have to
coexist while they protect somewhat different interests, just
as is the case with broadcasting law and competition law.
In the case of copyright law it protects the creative effort of
the author and his/her right to make money from their work
as well as to decide how to use it. For broadcasting law,
there may be reasons why certain content should be shown
without copyright creating obstacles for this. One example
is the idea of the right to broadcast short excerpts from a
work, even if the whole work is protected content. This
idea is in line with the right to fair use of copyrighted
material or can be seen as an analogy to the right to quote.
From a principled viewpoint the main issue on which
intellectual property law and competition law must find an
accommodation is balancing the benefits and costs of a
monopoly. The very idea behind intellectual property
protection is to provide a monopoly, as the holder of the
intellectual property right can exclude the use by others of
the protected property, whether copyrighted or industrial
property. Competition law, however, seeks to prevent
monopolies.72 Authors find that in recent years the EU has
become better at balancing these potentially conflicting
interests by looking more at de facto market power and the
real situation in any relevant market than presuming that
intellectual property rights always secure a position of
dominance. A more empirical assessment is better placed
to address real concerns.73 It is not automatically or always
so that a holder of an intellectual property right has sig-
nificant market power. However, in the situation at hand in
this case, the owner of the rights to the games in question
does have such significant market power in a very defined
and specific market.
From the copyright viewpoint, the case does not appear
to depart from earlier case law, where the existence of
copyright protection is just one factor that together with
other factors determines whether there is a de facto
monopoly. In the Magill case74 for example, which con-
cerned television programme listings, the copyright was
one element but other factors (such as the actual total
control of the material as such and its nature as an essential
facility for any competition in the specific market of
magazines with television programme listings) were also
considered.75
The Magill case concerned compulsory licensing and
because such licensing is a serious encroachment on the
rights of the copyright holder it is not something that
should be done lightly. The key to whether compulsory
licensing of anything protected with intellectual property
rights should be required is if such things are needed for
there to be any competition at all (in competition law ter-
minology whether the matter is an essential facility). For-
rester and Czapracka point out that the essential facility
doctrine appears more suited to physical infrastructure
(they use a bridge as an example76) but in practice various
networks such as for telecommunications often illustrate
this situation. They do not see that the essential facility
doctrine and the compulsory licensing that it may entail is
suited for intellectual property, not least as such property
may decrease in value if used. The very value of intellec-
tual property is to be able to decide if and how such
property is to be used.77 Intellectual property legislation is
71 Heinemann 2011, p. 306, 311.
72 The EU is giving increasing attention to the question of intellectual
property rights and competition law, albeit primarily in relation to
industrial property and to a large extent in the pharmaceutical sector.
There has been important case law in this field for several decades,
but recently EU is striving to make the legislative situation clearer as
well. See for example Regibeau and Rockett 2011 (COMP 2010/16).
73 Anderman 2011, p. 5.
74 Case C-241/91P and C-242/91 (1995) RTE and ITP v. Commis-
sion. ECR I-743.
75 Anderman 2011, pp. 14–15.
76 Forrester and Czapracka 2011, p. 147.
77 Ibid.
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in itself a careful balance of different interests and for
competition law to challenge this balance too much risks
depriving one area of law of its meaning, to accommodate
another area.
4 Final remarks
Ever since the Advocate General delivered her opinion in
Murphy, it was thought that liberalising the service market
for satellite transmission of sports, and as a necessary
corollary, creating an internal market for trade in decoder
cards, could result in a reorganisation of the entire broad-
casting sector in Europe. Without the protection of national
segmentation, the right holders would probably have to find
a new way to sell their rights to make up for the loss of
profits resulting from parallel trade in decoder cards.
However, looking at the latest value of FAPL broadcasting
rights and the manner in which they were distributed it
does not appear that any significant changes took place so
far.78
One impression of the cases is that the questions referred
and the treatment of them especially by the Advocate
General goes into a lot of technical detail, primarily about
the different elements of a broadcast in relation to copy-
right law. It is not evident that all this detail is necessary for
the question at hand, but the nature of modern broadcasting
transmission is indeed complicated as well as rapidly
developing so it is not unusual for authorities that deal with
regulation of audiovisual media services to get involved in
such interpretation of concepts vis-a`-vis the terminology
used in regulations, as the original terms used are no longer
clearly applicable. As the Advocate General points out,79
for example, the question of whether only parts of a
broadcast are protected by copyright has no bearing on the
application of rules in the Copyright Directive 2001/29.
Indeed, the exact determination of technical aspects of
broadcasting may not in the end change the legal and
regulatory situation.
The outcome of the case may look like a victory for
individuals in the EU, benefitting from free movement.
In reality it is more complicated than that. Intellectual
property law is based on a principle of territoriality,
which conflicts with the creation of an internal market
such as that of the EU. The easiest way to avoid the
problem would be to move the protection of intellectual
property rights to the level of the EU, but this has not
happened beyond a limited extent (with for example an
EU trademark). Thus there is a need to balance the
different interests protected by different sets of laws.
Audiovisual media services law has as one of its aims to
ensure that intellectual property—primarily copyright—
can be protected also in the audiovisual sphere. This
includes as an important component that holders of
copyright or neighbouring rights can make money on
their works also when these are used in broadcasting.
The main way to deal with this is through contracts
between the parties involved, with oversight but limited
intervention by authorities. The distinction between pri-
vate viewing and public viewing is important, as in the
case of private viewing, the viewer is at the end of the
chain and there is no added value from the use of the
copyrighted work beyond the value for the broadcast
organisation.80 In the broadcasting context, the broad-
casting organisation will pay for copyrighted works and
earn income for such payments through various means
such as subscription fees or advertising. The estimation
of audiences and potential income for broadcasters is
complex, imprecise and changing, but in the absence of
any more exact methods a way of approximate estima-
tion has been developed in practice so that it provides
guidance on the value of different works. An imperfect
but still functioning system to ensure that works reach
the audience on reasonable terms will be upset by this
judgement and it is not clear that a better system from
the viewpoint of end users will be developed, as the
rights holders may charge higher prices given that their
possibilities to estimate potential audiences are reduced
and the buyers—broadcast organisations—will have to
recuperate those costs somehow or reduce the number of
expensive programmes that they buy. The legislator and
regulators could (under current broadcasting law with the
principle of accessibility of major works) intervene to
some extent, but as any intervention to stipulate maxi-
mum prices or similar would harm the income of right
holders, it may have other negative effects down the
chain.
The Court finds that the estimation of potential audience
is still possible even without barriers between Member
States, which may be correct, although they appear to
underestimate the increased complexity of such estimations
if the current system for determining the audience changes.
This change comes at a time of reduced income from
advertising due to new technologies enabling new ways of
watching programmes which have made television adver-
tising less attractive.
78 See http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/news/news/latest-premier-
league-broadcast-rights-deals.html.
79 Para 99 of her Opinion.
80 Similar considerations are behind the different rules regarding
copyright in relation to copying for private or public purposes, as
alluded to in paragraphs 38–40 and 52 of Directive 2001/29.
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